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THE TERRIFYING LIBERATION OF LABOR
TiM KANE*
The future of American worker as a topic is fraught with
uncertainty and controversy, despite widespread agreement
about the direction of the winds of economic change. Two over-
lapping trends appear obvious to everyone: globalization and
accelerating technological change. Before 2001, these trends
were interpreted optimistically by most observers.' But following
the U.S. recession of 2001, capped as it was by the terror attacks
on September 11th, America's optimistic post-Cold War mindset
has been replaced by a resilient pessimism.2
Current measures of public confidence are sickly. Certainly
one reason is because for many years the monthly U.S, employ-
ment report showed declines, often steep, in the number of U.S.
payroll jobs. In manufacturing alone, one and a half million
positions were slashed after the 2001 recession officially ended,
capping forty-two straight months of losses.3 The question many
observers ask is: Did the 2001 recession actually end? This ques-
tion is so common that our economy is often described as being
in a jobless recovery.4 A flood of pessimistic articles have warned
of threats to the American worker: offshore outsourcing, stag-
nant wages, and the decline of organized labor versus corporate
power. What these analyses lack is a broad conceptual frame-
work that contextualizes faddish dangers.
From an objective macroeconomic point of the view, a more
accurate question to ask is if the 2001 recession ever began.
According to the textbook definition of two consecutive quarters
* Tim Kane, Ph.D., is the Director of The Heritage Foundation's Center
for International Trade and Economics. His research assistant, Denford
Madenyika, has a Masters in International Studies from North Carolina State
University.
1. See Peter Schwartz & Peter Leyden, The Long Boom: A History of the Future
1980-2020, WIRED, July 1997, at 115.
2. See, e.g., Jacob Hacker, False Positive, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16 & 23, 2004,
at 14; David J. Rothkopf, Just As Scary As Terror: Anyone Seen Our Economic Policy?,
WASH. POST, July 25, 2004, at BI.
3. Author calculations of data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Dep't of Labor.
4. See Daniel Aaronsom et al., Assessing the Jobless Recovery, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF CHI.: ECON. PERSP., Second Quarter 2004, at 2, available at http://www.
chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/ep-2%2OQtr_%202004-
Partjl.pdf.
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of GDP decline, a recession never occurred in 2001. Surely that
misses the point as well. Even though the economy was growing
impressively during 2002-2005 in terms of GDP, it was perceived
(wrongly) to be growing without any apparent need for addi-
tional labor. We can easily comprehend how a time of dramatic
economic change, even when that change is positive, is laden
with inherent uncertainty that creates a sense of fear. Faced with
the prospect that their economy may simply not need them,
many American workers are in a state of quiet terror about the
future of the labor force.
If most of the pessimistic analyses that substantiate worker
angst have no deep, long-term conceptual framework, it remains
a riddle why they are so popular. There is something genuine to
the story of workforce stagnation, even if macro indicators say
otherwise. Then it must be something beyond the numbers.
Perhaps fear is simply interwoven into our times, with foreign
terrorists wanting to kill us and foreign workers wanting to steal
our jobs. But I suspect another factor is in play.
There is a natural tension between personal freedom and
collective security; a tension resolved historically in American cul-
ture by an emphasis on individuality-higher risks, responsibili-
ties, and rewards. However, a perception of rising relative
income inequality, coupled with a latent fear of accelerating
change, is perhaps tipping the balance. Yale Political Scientist
Jacob Hacker argues that "insecurity is something that more and
more Americans, even the relatively well off, are confronting.,5
Hacker is one of the more eloquent pessimists and describes
what he sees as the Great Risk Shift, the title of his forthcoming
book.6 There is some truth in Hacker's vision, but not the whole
truth. Ultimately, it mirrors the ancient attitude that character-
izes freedom itself as a threat. This voice refers to the free mar-
ket as "untrammeled" and pure capitalism as equivalent to
uncultured nature, red in tooth and claw. No amount of pros-
perity satisfies these critics, just as it does not satisfy economic
man who is insatiable. This is, after all, the first lesson of eco-
nomics, which is the study of scarcity and insatiable appetites.
I believe that the synthesis of these two realities-genuine
prosperity on the one hand with rising anxiety on the other-is
not resolved in terms of risk shifting, inequality rising, or any
other description of the distribution of resources. I believe the
paradox is rooted in how we produce, not how we consume. If
we see modernity for what it is-incessant progress-then we rec-
5. Hacker, supra note 2, at 14.
6. JACOB HACKER, GREAT RISK SHIFT (forthcoming 2006).
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ognize the experience of the American workforce for what it is-
a terrifying liberation of labor.
Understanding the experience of modern labor as a libera-
tion begins with the admission that living standards are improv-
ing. This is a difficult admission, for liberals and conservatives
both, but it is the first and most important truth. Rising wealth
comes at a cultural price, which is the Luddite specter of a fully
automated future. This strikes a cultural nerve, but the specter
of automation is actually as old as industrialization itself. What
makes our generation's experience with automation different is
speed. Changing technologies are constant, yet the pace of
change has blurred any sense of normalcy. Consequently, the
challenge faced by capitalism is uncertainty. A nagging, opaque,
and very personal uncertainty: what kind of jobs will the future
hold for us?
As a process, the liberation of labor is represented by the
displacement of human muscle with machine power. Joseph
Schumpeter famously described this in terms of "creative destruc-
tion" where old techniques and firms are replaced by new ones.
7
This process yields a growth path for personal incomes that is
noisy, rough, and variable, but inevitably upward sloping. Conse-
quently, the liberation framework distinguishes between minor
unforeseeable recessions and daunting uncharted implications.
It also recognizes the vitality of decentralization and that the lib-
eration of labor is the product of the free market rather than the
centrally-planned state.
I. LIBERATION OF LABOR
The idea of liberation of labor is not an original one. In the
terminology of contemporary economics, it is described as rising
productivity due to labor-saving technological progress. The
2004 book The New Division of Labor: How Computers Are Creating
the Next Job Market by Ivy League economists Frank Levy and Rich-
ard Murnane is an updated explanation of how this progress
works.8 But it is an idea with a lengthy heritage dating back to
Adam Smith and Karl Marx.
Perhaps the single greatest contribution of Adam Smith was
his pioneering description of labor specialization as central to
the increasing wealth of a society because it yields higher produc-
tivity per worker. But Smith also described "the invention of a
7. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82-85
(1975).
8. FRANK LEVY & RicHARD MURNAME, THE NEW DIVISION OF LABOR: How
COMPUTERS ARE CREATING THE NEXT JOB MARKET (2004).
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great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour,
and enable one man to do the work of many" as one of the three
underlying components of the division of labor.9 Interestingly,
Smith was unclear on the potential impact of these "very pretty
machines," suggesting that division led to routinization with led
to mechanization, implying that the state of work could become
dehumanizing while unambiguously enriching.1"
Marx, famous today as the iconic critic of capitalism, pro-
claimed as fervently as any modern corporate evangelist that cap-
italism was the penultimate crucible of innovation and higher
productivity." Marx believed in the basic notion of progress.
While his conception of the end-state, as well as some of the syn-
thetic conditions of that state (such as the abolition of private
property), have been widely discredited, his vision of the process
remains largely intact.
Although this process of new labor-saving innovation is well
understood among economists nowadays as a morally good pro-
cess, it is an issue that was most intensively debated during the
1950s and 1960s.1 2 At the time, factory automation was visible
and destructive to traditional work. Also at the time, conven-
tional wisdom held that the labor force transformation was
binary, going from rural to urban, agricultural to industrial. The
urban, industrial economy was considered the end-state, and so
the large-scale automation of the factory was a shock to that
binary paradigm. Workers without work in the industrial center
could hardly be considered anything other than a threat to
stability.
Such fears were addressed most perceptively by Nobel econ-
omist Herbert Simon. In an obscure 1960 essay, recognizing that
most early human labor involved muscle power replaced by engi-
neered power and recognizing that man might lose all of his
absolute competitive advantages, Simon queried, "Won't a point
be reached where men are less productive than machines in all
9. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 7 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random
House 1937) (1776).
10. Id. at 9.
11. See KARL MARx, DAS KAPrTAL (Gateway Editions 1999) (1894).
12. SeeJaap H. Abbring &Jeffrey R. Campbell, Creative Destruction in Local
Markets, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI.: ECON. PERSP., Second Quarter 2004, at
50-51, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspec-
tives/ep_2%2OQtr_%202004_Part_4.pdf.
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processes, hence economically unemployable?"' 3 His answer was
no.
Before we explore Simon's answer, it might be helpful to
consider who he was. It might be even more helpful to walk
through the economic history of human progress in a few hun-
dred words or so. The next few paragraphs describe the libera-
tion of labor in retrospect.
Over time, the nature of work has gone through one revolu-
tion after another, but human history began without a distinction
between work and survival. Survival was a daily struggle for man
the hunter-gatherer. The agricultural revolution was the first to
change how human society was organized, and its immediate
achievement was a moderation of survival pressures. Great cities
arose from the stability that agriculture gave, and from those
came the glacial but persistent inventions: writing, alphabets, irri-
gation, and metallurgy. Each specialization, each technology,
alleviated the struggle for survival and changed the economy
gradually, with a number of equilibriums punctuated by indus-
trial revolutions.
America today is mid-stream in a revolution of work. One
realizes the old aphorism is true: "the only constant is change."
This is a labor revolution without end, not a singular metamor-
phosis. No longer do we face the basic pressures of survival,
clearly. Food is harvested by a small percentage of the popula-
tion, while other basic needs are increasingly provided by highly
capitalized factories: clothing, transportation, shelter, and com-
munication. Leisure is routine. Fundamentally, humans have
been liberated from working to protect, feed, and clothe them-
selves-basic survival-in order to return to the essentials of nur-
turing, healing, educating, and entertaining one another.
With two centuries of experience, the consequences of the
liberation of labor are much clearer to us than they were to
Smith or Marx. Casual observers have a better view of the mod-
ern economy than those specialists did, mainly because we have
more and better data. If we metaphorically think of the econo-
mist as a medical doctor, then the "patient" is the human econ-
omy, a patient that is growing very rapidly. The typical per capita
growth rate for most advanced economies has been roughly two
percent a year for nearly two hundred years,14 meaning that the
13. Herbert A. Simon, The Corporation: Will It Be Managed by Machines?, in
MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATIONS 1985, at 17, 23 (Melvin Anshen & George
Leland Bach eds., 1960) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
14. See ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONoMy: A MILLENNIAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 28 (2001).
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patient doubles in size every thirty-five years. But the metaphor is
still incomplete, because the human economy is not only grow-
ing, it is also evolving. The economy today is simply not the same
animal that was examined by Marx or Smith.
Consider for example the institution known as a corpora-
tion. This thing was unheard of in 1776, and even 1845. The
idea of a business owned by the masses, with stock equity traded
in a market to any commoner, simply did not exist until a series
of British laws were passed in the 1850s. It is tempting to inter-
pret the common stock corporation as a manifestation of Marx's
predicted synthesis of labor and capital (though certainly not the
synthesis he anticipated). A more important lesson concerns
economic evolution: there is no end-state to history. For our pur-
poses, this means the liberation of labor should not be expected
to settle into a stable equilibrium.
This constant technological liberation frustrates the news
media's constant attempts to describe the jobs of the future and
trivializes white-collar/blue-collar distinctions. It also frustrates
society's effort to plan and teach the skills of tomorrow to the
children of today (or even the working adults of today). I call
this uncertainty over what skills to teach for an unknowable
future the "Skills Paradox." The paradox is best understood in
terms of how the job mix has changed, a quantitative matter we
will return to after considering Simon's answer.
II. SIMON'S ANSWER
Herbert Simon was a polymath. He was at once an econo-
mist, a psychologist, a political scientist, and a cognitive scientist,
celebrated with the top awards and honorary degrees in all of
these fields.' 5 Simon coined the term "bounded rationality" and
published over one thousand articles across many disciplines,
making it nearly impossible to categorize him. But he will proba-
bly be best remembered for pioneering theories and develop-
15. See Byron Spice, CMU Legend Herbert Simon Dies at Age 84: Father of Arti-
ficial Intelligence and Nobel Prize Winner, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAzETTE, Feb. 10, 2001,
at Obit. Al. As Dr. Simon's obituary stated:
In addition to the Nobel, Dr. Simon was the recipient of virtually
every top award in every scientific field he pursued: the A.M. Turing
Award in computer science, the American Psychological Association
Award for Outstanding Lifetime Contributions to Psychology, induc-
tion into the Automation Hall of Fame, the American Society of Public
Administration's Dwight Waldo Award and the National Medal of Sci-
ence, among them.
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ment in what is now called artificial intelligence (AI), the science
of how machines can learn to think.
Simon died in 2001 at the age of eighty-four, leaving a tower-
ing legacy as a scholar and teacher. His interest in computers
began with his emphasis on the utilization of mathematical mod-
els in the social sciences, and shortly he saw that computers
could be used to model human cognition itself. As described in
his obituary in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, his fifty-two years of work
at Carnegie-Mellon University included, "key roles in creating
the computer science department and the Robotics Institute and
founding the cognitive science group within the psychology
department."' 6 His legendary status as an advocate for "hard" AI,
which holds that machines will be able to achieve truly human-
like consciousness, makes his answer to the question of machines
displacing humans somewhat ironic.
Simon was asked to write an essay for a symposium com-
memorating the 10th anniversary of Carnegie Mellon University,
entitled, The Corporation: Will It Be Managed by Machines?7 In that
essay, and with all the caveats about the difficulty of making such
predictions, Simon tried to foresee the role machines would play
by the year 1985, a quarter century ahead of his time and nearly a
quarter century behind ours. He broadened the question to
wonder if mankind might become economically unemployable
and predicted that automation would most strongly be felt in the
factory and office.
Remember that the economics profession has consistently
recognized the role of machinery as an enhancement to the pro-
ductive power of labor. More capital per worker should mean
more income per worker. Simon, however, was grounded in
more than economic analysis, and was able to recognize the
accelerating sophistication of computerized capital. He also pos-
sessed one of the world's finest minds for appreciating man
unsentimentally as a factor of production: "a pair of eyes and
ears, a brain, a pair of hands, a pair of legs, and some muscles for
applying force."' 8
Simon suggested that many of the muscle and clerical tasks
mankind had traditionally done were being overtaken by
machines. Think how we celebrate sophisticated supply chains
presently-a powerful example of information technology, mod-
ern transportation infrastructure, vast bar-coded inventories and
automated warehouses. In one section, he wrote that the genu-
16. Id.
17. Simon, supra note 13.
18. Id. at 30.
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inely workerless factory would be technically feasible long before
1985. But he dismissed "the fear of technological unemploy-
ment," arguing that the economic effects might lead to even
more demand for factory output and hence even more workers
(to maintain and oversee the assembly lines, for example).' 9
Interestingly, Simon used the example of machine-assisted
psychiatry. He was quick to warn, "we should not make the sim-
ple assumption that the higher-status occupations, and those
requiring the most education, are going to be the least auto-
mated."20 A handful of examples make the case: think of the
sharp decline in tax accounting due to the advent of sophisti-
cated tax preparation software, or bank tellers being displaced by
ATMs. He made a similar warning to those who imagined that
machines will never have "bedside manners," by pointing out
how many people have "affective relations with such mechanism
as automobiles, rolling mills-and computers. "21
Simon went on to dissect the nature of machines as they
have evolved within the economy, which in retrospect continue
to be designed for specific purposes (microwave ovens and cell
phones) not as embodied robots that are general-purpose
beings. Humankind is especially gifted in just that way: general
cognition, problem solving, unbound curiosity, and creativity.
Unlike computerized machines, and even unlike most natural
creatures, humans are not idiot savants.
22
Another Simon insight was that automation was a liberating
force that allowed humans to specialize in new niches as the eco-
nomic environment evolved in scale. A dynamic economy with
new products and categories of service would logically be incapa-
ble of reaching an end to work. But we are still left with the skills
paradox, and here Simon's answer is ambiguous:
Finally, in the entire occupied population, a larger fraction
of members than at present will be engaged in occupations
where 'personal service' involving face-to-face human
interaction is an important part of the job. I am confident
19. Id. at 52-53.
20. Id. at 35.
21. Id. at 36.
22. Richard N. Langlois' 2002 working paper is the best summary I have
found of the Simon's predictions. He writes, "the evolution of flexible cogni-
tion is the exception, not the rule.... Nature's tendency on the whole is to
create idiots-savants not general-purpose problem solvers: lightning fast chee-
tahs, bats that echolocate, birds that navigate by the stars." See Richard N. Lan-
glois, Cognitive Comparative Advantage and the Organization of Work: Lessons from
Herbert Simon's Vision of the Future 29 (Univ. of Conn. Dep't of Econ. Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 2002-20, 2002).
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in stating this conclusion; far less confident in conjecturing
what these occupations will be.23
Levy and Murnane believe that Simon's 1960 essay deserves
a "prize for foretelling the future" if such a prize were given.24
They use it as a foundation for their own predictions about the
future mix ofjobs. Addressing that skills paradox may be a fool's
errand for all of us, and Simon's was probably exemplary in con-
fessing the murkiness of his own crystal ball. But one thing is
clear: the murkiness is creating much higher anxiety about eco-
nomic weakness than is warranted.
III. FEARONOMICS AND THE ILLUSION OF LOST JOBS
Pessimistic news stories should come as no surprise in an
industry known for the motto, "If it bleeds, it leads." During Feb-
ruary of 2006, Time magazine had two cover stories that played
off workplace anxiety-one on America's "secret workforce" of
illegal aliens, and another asking "Is America Flunking Science?"
atop a parody photo of a child scientist in an exploded labora-
tory.2 5 In July of 2005, Fortune magazine pictured a comical ren-
dition of "America: the 97-lb. Weakling," a sickly Uncle Sam
bullied by a buff Chinese proletariat.2 6 Alarmist articles and
books were plenty popular even before the 2001 recession, of
course, but they are predominant since September l1th, espe-
cially during coverage of the most recent election.2 7 The most
egregious example may be a Washington Post opinion article pub-
lished in July 2004 which said the Bush administration's lack of
an economic plan is 'Just as Scary as Terror.
28
To put this outrageous claim in context, realize that the
author was suggesting the economic costs of terrorism were
dwarfed by the cost of weak economic leadership. It may be true
that the economic cost of terror has been hyped, but this
becomes clear in the context of the strong, not weak, domestic
economy. For example, I routinely asked my students in the
semesters after 2001 to estimate how much the U.S. economy
23. Simon, supra note 13, at 38.
24. LEVY & MURNAME, supra note 8, at 8.
25. See Michael D. Lemonick, Are We Losing Our Edge?, TIME, Feb. 13,
2006, at 22; Nathan Thornburgh, Inside the Life of the Migrants Next Door, TIME,
Feb. 6, 2006, at 36.
26. Geoffrey-Colvin, America Isn't Ready: Here's What to Do About It, FoR-
TUNE, July 25, 2005, at 70.
27. See, e.g., Dan Rather in Crisis, Media Research Ctr. (Sept. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.mrc.org/campaign/04/rather.asp.
28. See David J. Rothkopf, Just as Scary as Terror: Anyone Seen Our Economic
Policy?, WASH. PosT, July 25, 2005, at B1.
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grew or declined since the September l1th attacks. Inevitably,
the average class answer was a decline of three to five percent,
roughly four-hundred billion dollars of total production. In fact,
the American economy grew by fifty billion dollars in the fourth
quarter of 2001, immediately after the attacks.29 In real terms,
U.S. GDP is 13.8 percent bigger as of the final quarter of 2005
than it was during the third quarter of 2001, a real increase of
1.55 trillion dollars.30 That is equivalent to adding the entire
California economy (1.55 trillion dollars in 2005)31 and nearly
the entire French economy (2.12 trillion dollars at parity).32
If terrorism is meant to be an attack on liberal democratic
capitalism, it so far amounts to a pebble cast against a tidal wave.
We cannot dispute the threat of future terrorism could be much
more damaging, but that is neither here nor there. If my stu-
dents are representative, then the general population simply is
not able to comprehend the scope of its prosperity. Psychologi-
cally, the attacks of September 11 th have made a mark, and it is
an event where "terror" has been referenced, so would say
manipulated, to score political points. Democrats accuse Repub-
licans of using September l1th to stoke fears, but Democrats
stand accused of demagoguery on economic anxiety just the
same.
In a purely political context, the jobless recovery stands as an
indictment of George W. Bush. Even after Bush won the 2004
presidential election, confidence in his economic leadership con-
tinued to erode. According to a recent Ipsos poll, "[President]
Bush's marks on overall job approval and for handling the econ-
omy are near their lowest level .... Bush's job approval is now at
40 percent and his approval on handling the economy at 39 per-
cent. '33 Fully seventy-two percent of respondents to Gallup's mid-
October 2005 poll registering a negative view of the economy,
29. See Eugene P. Seskin et al., Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Annual Revision of the National Income and Product Accounts, Annual
Estimates for 2002-2004: Quarterly Estimates for 2002:1-2005:1, SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT Bus., Aug. 2005, at 13, 14-15, available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/ARTI-
CLES/2005/08August/0805_NIPARevision.pdf.
30. Author calculations are from the Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce data. See id.
31. See id.
32. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., QUARTERLY NAT'L ACCOUNTS
FOR OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 267 (Apr. 2006),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/4/33727936.pdf.
33. See Bush's Approval Rating Plummets, W. MORNING NEWS (Plymouth,
UK), Feb. 11, 2006, at 23.
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rating it one of the two worst options of "Only Fair" or "Poor." 4
This is slightly better than 2003 but actually worse than 2004. In
contrast, four years after the 1992 recession, the percentage of
negative responses in the Gallup poll had shrunk nearly in half,
from ninety percent to fifty-two percent. The macroeconomic
indicators were arguably better in 2005 than in 1996, so why the
difference in opinions?
The existence of liberal media bias is one explanation that
cannot be brushed aside. New research confirms that major
news networks accentuate negative indicators over positive ones,
especially when the Republican Party holds power,3 5 and it has
maintained control of the House of Representatives, Senate, and
Presidency since January 2001. However, Republicans bear some
blame themselves, especially that caucus of anti-immigrant voices
who blame illegal aliens for stealing American jobs and depress-
ing American wages. It cannot be true that the economy is doing
well thanks to tax cuts, but poorly because of immigrants-or
poorly because of high oil prices, but well due to the housing
boom.
But the dearth of job creation from 2002-2004 represents
something deeper: an affront to free market economics. It ful-
fills capitalism's worst image as good for rich capitalists at the
expense of alienated workers. Among academics, the concept of
jobless recovery-in which gross domestic production (GDP)
expands while labor markets contract-is a paradox, contrary to
theory and history. Oddly, only one labor indicator is negative:
total nonfarm employment.
The primary source of official employment statistics is the
U.S. Department of Labor, which publishes the "Employment Sit-
uation" on the first Friday of each month.36 Two numbers, new
34. Jeffrey M. Jones, Public's Economic Outlook Remains Pessimistic, GALLUP
POLL NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 19, 2005, LEXIS, News and Business ("Gallup's Oct.
13-16 poll finds that economic ratings continue to be fairly negative, with only
28% of Americans rating current conditions as excellent (3%) or good (25%).
Twenty-six percent rate them as poor.").
35. In their survey of major newspaper headlines, John R. Lott and Kevin
A. Hassett find, "For all the newspapers, Republicans receive between 9.6 and
14.7 percentage points less positive coverage than Democrats and the differ-
ences are statistically significant at least at the 1 percent level for a two-tailed t-
test. That is about 20 to 30 percent less positive coverage .... " JOHN R. Lor &
KEVIN A. HASSETr, Am. ENTER. INST., Is NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF ECONOMIC
EVENTS POLITICALLY BIASED? 14 (2004), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/
20040913_588453%5B1 %5D.pdf.
36. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT SITU-
ATION SUMMARY: MARCH 2006 (2006), http:/www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/empsit_04072006.pdf [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT SITUATION SUMMARY].
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payroll jobs and the unemployment rate, are the headlines for
the day. Often overlooked is that the monthly report is made up
of two parts: the larger, indirect payroll survey and the smaller, but
more direct household survey.
Both surveys report a different sum total of U.S. employ-
ment. Growth in payroll jobs may be different than the growth
in total workers from one month to the next, but the surveys con-
sistently reported the same trends over the years. Suddenly after
2001, the two surveys diverged widely, a break in magnitude that
had no precedent. 7
In 2002, the payroll survey reported a net loss of half a mil-
lion jobs, while the household survey reported a net gain of the
same amount. Amazingly, the divergence widened further in
2003 when payrolls finally experienced a net gain of one-hun-
dred thousand jobs, dwarfed by the gain of 1.3 million in the
household survey.3 8 The two surveys seemed to be in alignment
again in 2004 when both reported gains of 2.1 million jobs. But
household numbers surged again in 2005, outpacing payrolls 2.5
million compared to 1.8 million. 9 As a consequence, we are liv-
ing in an era when one employment survey shows month after
month of record highs while the other gives credence to the illu-
sion of a jobless recovery.
In early 2004, in response to incessant queries on the pay-
roll-household puzzle, the BLS began issuing a sixteen-page doc-
ument on the same date of the monthly employment report, in
which it reconciles the two surveys. This exercise aims to make
payroll apples comparable to household oranges. After peeling
away non-payroll and other workers from the household survey's
total, the reconciliation document reveals that the divergence of
three million does not go away, but in fact gets worse.4 ° What
that means in plain terms is that the government's experts, and
they are very smart people, do not know what is happening to the
labor force any better than you do.
One possible cause of the payroll-household divergence is
loaded with irony: the dynamic economy itself creates an illusion
in the payroll data. We know that payrolls systematically double-
count people who change jobs, though this was considered a neg-
37. See TIM KANE, HERITAGE FOUND., CTR. FOR DATA ANALYSIS REPORT #04-
03, DIVERGING EMPLOYMENT DATA: A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE PAYROLL SURVEY
(2004), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Labor/loader.cfm?url=
/commonspot/security/getile.cfm&PageID=57715.
38. Author calculations are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Labor data.
39. Id.
40. See EMPLOYMENT SITUATION SUMMARY, supra note 35.
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ligible problem until it was highlighted by Congressman David
Dreier.4 Consider that during a typical month in the 1990s,
three percent of all workers changed employers.4 2 Roughly four
million people were counted on two payrolls every month." So
when that rate of turnover declined after September l1th, the
payroll survey reported an illusory job loss.
IV. THE EVOLVING WORKFORCE
It is no surprise that the conventional paradigm of labor
markets is unable to explain the weakness of the payroll survey.
That view is static, and it imagines the economy as an equilib-
rium. But equilibrium analysis, as Joseph Schumpeter explained
long ago, misses the central element of dynamic change in the
capitalist engine.
The static view emphasizes net changes in employment from
month to month. But for every one netjob added, the real econ-
omy is dynamically destroying eight jobs while creating nine new
ones. By the same token, a steady "natural" unemployment rate
of five percent masks the fact that the typical unemployment
spell lasts only a couple of months. The reality of free labor mar-
kets today is one of constant churn. A longitudinal study by the
Labor Department documented an average of 9.6 jobs for baby
boomers over their first eighteen adult working years.44 Most
people understand this intuitively, since the common American
experience is to change employers often, with months of non-
employment between some jobs, and overlaps of vacation time
between others.
Dynamism means more than churn, however. The composi-
tion of jobs is evolving away from production and towards ser-
vices. For example, the number and percentage of people
needed to supply agricultural products during one year is always
more than during succeeding years. The enhancement of
worker productivity means that it takes fewer workers for the
same amount of output. Nowhere has that productivity dyna-
mism been more evident than in the manufacture of goods dur-
ing the latter half of the 20th century.
41. See 152 CONG. REc. H303 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Rep.
David Dreier).
42. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE
LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 66, tbl.31 (2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/
cps/wlf-databook.pdf.
43. Tim Kane & Andrew Grossman, The Jobs Numbers That You're NOT
Hearing About, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 2004, at 15A.
44. See Labor Month in Review, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Sept. 2002, at 2.
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The number Americans employed in the manufacturing sec-
tor dropped from 17.3 million in 2000 to 14.2 million in 2005. 45
The peak year was 1979 at 19.4 million, which represented
twenty-two percent of the total workforce. 46 Last year, only
eleven percent of workers were in manufacturing, while 83.4 per-
cent were in service-providing jobs in 2005 (the highest ever). 7
The long-awaited service economy isn't coming. It arrived long
ago.
But are jobs in the service sector worthwhile? Service sector
jobs are often professional in nature, and are generally much bet-
ter paying and safer than the blue-collars trades of last century.
We tend to glorify the jobs of our hard-working ancestors as
sacred, even though in many instances they are jobs that our
ancestors would not wished on us. Few mothers dream of their
children working in the dangerous factories and mines of yester-
year. Indeed, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas featured an
interesting chart in its 2000 Annual Report which showed that
workers employed in the "20 Worst Jobs" declined from sixteen
percent in 1900 to under five percent in 2000.48
Of course, many workers classified as "manufacturing" never
have and never will twist a bolt, or even visit a factory floor.
Industrial managers, accountants, sales representatives, and engi-
neers are all classified as manufacturers in payroll data if they are
employed by a manufacturing company. The numbers above are
based on industrial classification. A more accurate perspective
may be occupational, which counts managers, accountants, and
marketers as information workers.
In fact, the annual U.S. Census asks people what they do for
a living. In 2000, just under nineteen million people reported
working in "production" which includes actual manufacturing
workers.49 There are also eleven million non-farm "managers,"
26.2 million "professional" workers, and 34.6 million "sales and
office" workers.5 ° To put manufacturing in further perspective,
45. See EMPLOYMENT SITUATION SUMMARY, supra note 36.
46. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Table B-i: Employ-
ees on Nonfarm Payrolls by Industry Sector, http://www.bls.gov/webapps/leg-
acy/cesbtabl.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2006) (click the "Manufacturing" box,
retrieve data, and expand the years displayed to show all data).
47. See EMPLOYMENT SITUATION SUMMARY, supra note 36.
48. FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, HAVE A NICE DAY! THE AMERICAN JOUR-
NEY TO BETTER WORKING CONDITIONS: ANNUAL REPORT 2000, at 19 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.dallasfed.org/fed/annual/2000/arOO.pdf.
49. CENSUS 2000 BRIEF, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL
GROUPS AND SUBGROUPS BY SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at tbl.1 (2003),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-25.pdf.
50. Id.
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there are more people doing "construction" and "maintenance"
work in the U.S. than there are actually producing new goods.'
There are half as many health-care providers as manufacturers.52
All this means that human beings are not needed in large num-
bers to produce the food, clothing, and even durable goods that
are a society consumes. We have largely been liberated from
these basic economic functions.
By 1990, information-related jobs were the dominant occu-
pational sector, employing three of every five workers in
America. The ascendancy of brain work is the predominant
trend of the last century, and seems more than likely to continue.
Details on occupational shifts seem to indicate that most of
the job losses in industry are exactly what Simon predicted: auto-
mation of repetitive muscle jobs on the assembly line, even as
design and maintenance positions hold steady.53 Human labor is
being liberated from the dangerous factory floor of the twentieth
century, just as it was liberated from the tedium of farm life.
Policymakers must grapple with the reality, not of recession
and recovery, but a unique evolutionary restructuring of the
workforce. It involves the demise of whole industries and the rise
of unforeseen ones. It involves massive investments in new physi-
cal capital, sensitive to tax laws and interest rates. And it hurtles
workers into new occupations and industries with entirely new
skill sets for which they are not trained. Or does it?
I call this the invisible backhand argument. Normally, I use
the term "invisible backhand" to describe an uncaring market
which is ignorant of anything that is not participating as a sup-
plier or consumer. A market of ten participants is ignorant and
unsympathetic to an eleventh person. But I use the term in the
present context to describe a scene in which the pace of techno-
logical change is accelerating, rewarding some workers who can
keep pace, but leaving many more behind. It is a compelling
story, but I doubt it is true.
The skills gap is a fundamental thread in the worker angst
fabric, but it is deeply in need of some critical examination. Let's
play devil's advocate. Think of a company or co-worker that you
admire. Is what you admire a skill-set narrowly defined? I sus-
pect that the skills most valuable to the future are broad skills:
integrity, dependability, intelligence, adaptability, friendliness.
Soft skills, not hard, are what define us. And those hard skills
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Simon, supra note 13, at 52-53.
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that matter most are general-purpose abilities like creativity,
teamwork, and problem-solving.
V. PARADOX RESOLVED
If displaced workers were, in fact, starting from zero each
time an industry was being liberated by technology, then what
explains the persistent rise in worker productivity coupled with
low unemployment? One of the populist explanations for the
jobless recovery of 2002-2003 was that high productivity was
destroying jobs permanently, and that higher unemployment
rates must obtain.
What we do know is that waves of labor dislocation have yet
to fulfill dystopian predictions of mass unemployment. The
unemployment rate in the U.S. stands below five percent, and
has declined dramatically in the years since Hacker and others
began issuing dire warnings about rising insecurity, jobs being
outsourced to China, and the demise of great American compa-
nies like AT&T and General Motors.
The most persistent explanation for the low unemployment
rate is a true canard: it does not count discouraged workers. In
fact, "discouraged" workers have been counted in Labor Depart-
ment surveys since 1994, and there are no more now than during
the typical month in the 1990s. Another common argument is
that the employment-to-population ratio has fallen sharply and
stayed down. This too is a ruse, since the labor force participa-
tion rate started dropping before the 2001 recession when so
many baby boomers started to retire (early and healthy). More
importantly, the reason why a smaller portion of Americans work
is much more interesting than the alarmists let on: half to two-
thirds of the decline is due to the cohort of sixteen to nineteen
year-olds who are choosing not to enter the labor force at all.54
No pessimistic explanation exists for this, but more kids in school
is certainly not a harmful prospect.
And make no mistake, the U.S. is productive. In one way,
America is defying traditional economic theory by pushing out
the frontier of productivity even faster than other advanced
economies can catch up. When Japan's GDP grows at two per-
cent a year, it is still far below the U.S. in per capita production
terms. But when U.S. GDP grows each quarter, it advances fur-
ther into the uncharted frontier of potential human output. The
miracle of the new economy is that American output per person
seems to be accelerating, not just growing, in sharp contrast to
54. EMPLOYMENT SITUATION SUMMARY, supra note 36, at tbl.A-1.
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the perception of professional economists a decade ago. The
infamous productivity slow-down of the late 1970s is now seen as
a hiccup, not a plateau, and productivity is growing at 3.8 per-
cent annually since 2000."5
In sum, the post-2001 data paint a picture of a workforce not
in duress, but in metamorphosis. We live in Herbert Simon's
world, even though he offered no resolution for what jobs come
next. As I discussed above, I am less willing to take the skills par-
adox seriously. I remain unconvinced that there are any three
skills more important than "reading, writing, and arithmetic."
These skills are easy to deride as pedantic, but they do not hone
without higher cognitive functions (creativity and learning to
learn) that are the true magic of human capital.
So the question remains: what are those jobs of the future?
I frankly think the answer is easy to see, for it is not a ques-
tion of supply, but of demand. Forecasting jobs of the future
depends entirely on the consumption trends of the future and
prices. Here is the key: as goods become ever cheaper, where
will Americans choose to spend money? Entertainment, educa-
tion, health, and construction. Who can deny the rise of
entertainment as a massive industry? Hollywood and Las Vegas
embody the trend, as does the professionalization of sports and
the literal rise of massive sports arenas in every major city. Mean-
while, health care continues to take a larger percentage of total
consumption every year. This is partly a sign of a dysfunctional
health system, but also represents real gains in quality and lon-
gevity. It is hard to imagine less spending on health care in the
century ahead, or fewer jobs in that sector.
The liberation of labor allows humans to return to funda-
mentals: nurturing the young and old, expanding the mind.
The real question to me is not actually that one left unan-
swered by Simon. I have little doubt what the newjobs will be, at
least over the horizon of my potential lifetime. Rather, I wonder
how the political institutions will handle the growing anxiety of
rapid technological change once a major business cycle hits, and
if you believe that cycles are natural, then this hit is inevitable.
While recovery should be easy, the political reaction is likely to
gum up the process of liberation permanently.
55. Gains in U.S. Productivity: Stopgap Measures or Lasting Change?, FRSB
ECON. LETrER (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., S.F., Cal.) (Mar. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2005/el2OO5-05.pdf
(stating that productivity growth is accelerating twice as fast as the previous two
decades, and averaging 3.8 percent during 2001-2004).
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The central near-horizon challenge of modern capitalism is
constant, unpredictable change in demand for different workers
and skills. The debate among policymakers is how to guide the
transition to new skill sets. On one side are the fading industries
and unions which use their leverage to subsidize the past. On the
other side is the laissez-faire solution: do nothing. A third
approach is proposed by new-fashioned statists who perceive a
need for new worker skills, but address the need with centralized
training programs. But a fourth policy option exists.
A liberation framework suggests that core skills matter most,
meaning that government should focus on early education and
literacy. Economic theory also suggests that interventions work
most effectively when the consumer, not the supplier, is subsi-
dized. Let the lifelong student use government money to select a
training program, which is supplied by the free market. Ideally,
the American people will utilize the experimental diversity of
fifty states rather than a single, inflexible national standard when
it devises new policies to address the skills paradox.
What of the longer horizon of capitalism? Will the accelera-
tion of technology outpace our ability to retrain to new skills and
refrain from protecting older occupations? Will automation
breed a laziness and dependency among men, creating what
Nietzsche called the "last man," without dignity, bravery, or
yearning?56 Likewise, will competitive capitalism give way, as
Joseph Schumpeter predicated, to a new form of socialism, since
only massive firms with state-insured grants be able to afford and
coordinate the ever-larger R&D research necessary to create new
technology?
The computer and Internet revolutions of recent decades
provide some answers. The prominent success of so many rebel-
lious entrepreneurs tells us all we need to know about the Last
Man. The new business model that relies more on acquisitions
of small startups as superior to in-house R&D also debunks the
notion of socialized technology development. Rather than an
army of Organization Man (and woman), modernity delivered
Steve Jobs, Larry Page, Barry Diller, Michael Jordan, and Mia
Hamm. The instinct to compete and dominate has not been
tamed or extinguished, but rather been channeled by free mar-
kets into productive, creative venues.
But we do well to remember that modernity also yielded
Mother Teresa and Pat Tillman. Humans are blessed with will-
56. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER 459 (Walter Kaufmann ed.,
Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1968) (1901).
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power, yes, but also an enduring sense of service to our fellow
man. With that in mind, one doubts we will ever run out of work.

